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DIGITIZING SCENT AND FLAVOR: 
A COPYRIGHT PERSPECTIVE
Amara Lopez*
Should the flavor of a cheese fall under copyright protection? The 
Court of Justice of the European Union recently confronted this 
question in Levola Hengelo BV v. Smilde Foods. Although the court 
ultimately denied protection, its reasoning opened many doors for 
those seeking intellectual property protection for scents and flavors. 
The court implied that it was the subjective nature of a cheese flavor 
that bars it from enjoying the protection copyright affords, which begs 
the question of what would happen if there were a sufficiently objective
way to describe a flavor.
Recent developments in technology have led to the digitization of 
scent and flavor. In the intellectual property space, digitization 
provides a superior means of fixation for scents and flavors but it also 
threatens to make reverse engineering much easier. This would take 
away the protection trade secret law affords to scents and flavors. This 
will undoubtedly push industry leaders to seek more protection from 
the law. This Note explores how copyright law in the United States and 
the European Union might handle this new technology and argues that 
protection should not come in the United States until Congress weighs 
all considerations and adds a new subject matter category for scents 
and flavors to the U.S. Copyright Act
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“Aromyx is Google Maps for Taste and Scent. It provides the flavor 
directions to get to any scent or taste.”1
INTRODUCTION
Digitizing music revolutionized the music industry by shifting distribu-
tion from CDs to Internet streaming platforms that share files instantly. The 
music industry is still dealing with the impact of the monumental change 
that came with digitization.
2
Today, developing technology may do the 
same thing to our olfactory senses of scent and taste.
The new technology digitizing scent and flavor has endless applica-
tions. In the medical field, it could detect diseases by measuring a patient’s
breath. In the consumer product industry, it could accurately detect food in-
gredients and spoilage.
3
In theory, this technology could allow a digital fla-
vor “to be transmitted by e-mail or over the internet, without transmitting 
any physical object.”
4
A person could experience a product’s flavor
5
in a 
1. AROMYX, http://www.aromyx.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2020) (quoting Dr. J Bruce 
German, Professor, University of California, Davis).
2. The difficulty associated with technological developments is reflected in the frus-
trating complexity of the Orrin G. Hatch–Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act (“MMA”). 
“The MMA is over 100 pages long, and is ‘Exhibit A’ for why people hate lobbyists and law-
yers so much.” Chris Castle, The Music Modernization Act – The Devil is in the Details,
MUSIC TECH. POL’Y (Feb. 8, 2018), https://musictechpolicy.com/2018/02/08/guest-post-by-
schneidermaria-the-music-modernization-act-the-devil-is-in-the-details.
3. See Kristopher Sturgis, Could a New Biosensor Be Able to Smell Cancer?, MIDDI
ONLINE (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.mddionline.com/could-new-biosensor-be-able-smell-
cancer.
4. John T. Cross, Trademark Issues Relating to Digitalized Flavor, 19 YALE J.L. &
TECH 340, 345 (2018).
5. The word flavor here means “the full sensation experienced by the combined senses 
of taste, smell, and the other senses.” Id. Using flavor to think about application of this new 
technology is helpful because it encompasses both relevant senses of taste and smell. Id.
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way divorced from the product itself through a stimulus device, making it 
possible for a digital flavor to become a commodity in its own right.
6
Signif-
icantly, digitization allows flavors to be copied exactly and to exist perma-
nently without degradation – a problem that the chemical reproduction of 
flavors faces.
7
But can the technology help, for example, the Kraft Heinz 
Company protect the comprehensive flavor of the Kraft Macaroni and 
Cheese from imitations?
One reason why the digitization of scent and flavor is important for 
proprietors of scented or tasted goods is that it threatens the protection af-
forded to them by trade secret law. The ability to analyze a flavor and then 
create an exact replica makes legal reverse engineering much easier. This 
Note will explore the technology that quantifies scents and flavors at this 
completely new level of detail from a copyright law perspective, with some 
comparison of the legal landscape between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union (“EU”). I will begin by explaining the law governing copyright 
as it pertains to scent and flavor today, before digitization. Following that, I 
will discuss how this new technology changes the analysis. I will conclude 
with insights on whether copyright protection should extend to a scent or 
flavor based on the introduction of this new technology.
Levola Hengelo BV v. Smilde Foods, originating in the Netherlands and 
heard in the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), addressed 
the copyrightability of a cheese flavor. Dicta in the case left many unan-
swered questions as to what exactly is copyrightable. In particular, the case 
stated that taste is not copyrightable because it cannot be pinned down or 
expressed objectively, and that it is instead “identified essentially on the ba-
sis of taste sensations and experiences.”
8
Can the fact that developing tech-
nology will be able to do just that—objectively express a taste—afford scent 
and flavor works IP protection where there was none before?
I. THE TECHNOLOGY: DIGITIZING SCENT AND FLAVOR
Humans experience smell, and thereby taste, through nerve cells called 
olfactory receptors.
9
These receptors react to odoriferous molecules that en-
ter the organs inside our noses and mouths.
10
The receptors carry a neuro-
6. Id. at 358.
7. Id. at 348.
8. Case C-310/17, Levola Hengelo BV v. Smilde Foods BV, 2018 EUR-Lex CELEX 
899, ¶. 42 (Nov. 13, 2018).
9. See Reginald Chapman & Elizabeth Bernays, Olfactory Receptor, ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/olfactory-receptor (last visited Dec. 19, 
2019).
10. A recent study showed that olfactory receptors are also found on the tongue. See
Smelling with Your Tongue, SCIENCEDAILY, https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/04/
190424083405.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
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message from the scent molecules to the olfactory bulb, a nerve structure in 
the brain.
11
The electrical signal is next sent deeper into the brain, where the 
conscious representation of smell then occurs.
12
The conscious processing of a smell happens differently with each per-
son. This is largely because some of the brain regions processing a scent are 
also involved in memory. That subjectivity is coupled with a so-called “ol-
factory illiteracy”; humans are not adept at naming or recognizing scent.
13
But despite this illiteracy, humans are capable of discerning scent more than 
it might currently seem.
14
If not due to human inability, it could be that the 
market for scent is less developed than the market for sound (music) or sight 
(visual art – paintings, movies, etc.), leaving less opportunity and reason for 
humans to exercise their olfactory senses. It could also be that the market 
for olfactory senses has not developed because there has not been an acces-
sible means of categorizing and recording scents and flavors.
Imagining digitization of olfactory senses is not an intuitive endeavor, 
and it is being done in different ways.
15
The company Aromyx, for instance, 
is engineering “biosensors” that replicate the 402 olfactory receptors hu-
mans have and use to smell and taste.
16
A sample of a scent or flavor is put 
onto a disposable chip with a digital readout, where a plate reader extracts 
data from it.
17
That data is then used by software to create digital representa-
tions of the scent or flavor that can detect disease, food spoilage, and more. 
The company calls its technology “a camera for taste and smell”
18
that pro-
vides a way to analyze, generate, and synthesize scents and flavors with 
11. Chapman & Bernays, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. See Alastair Gee, The Uneducated Nose, NEW YORKER (Feb. 26, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/naming-scents-uneducated-nose.
14. Id.
15. One company created a device that can receive and transmit scents concocted by 
users and curated to go along with a “scent playlist.” The product’s creators have more ideas 
for commercializing scents, including the idea of adding a sensory element to the moviegoers’
experience. See Meg Miller, The Harvard Professor Who Is Digitizing Scent, FAST COMPANY
(Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3059380/this-harvard-professor-is-digitizing-
scent. Others plan to enrich the museum experience with scent. See Linda Tischler, First 
Transatlantic “Scent Message” Sends Smell of Paris to New York, FAST COMPANY (June 17, 
2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3031990/first-transatlantic-scent-message-sends-smell-
of-paris-to-new-york. Various new companies are experimenting with flavor profiling of 
foods using an ingredient’s scent, ranging from a tool that measures consumer taste and die-
tary preferences to an application that helps users select complimentary ingredients based on 
the flavors of what they have in their kitchen. See Catherine Lamb, Services that Combine 
Flavor and AI Are a New Food Tech Trend, SPOON (Mar. 7, 2018), https://thespoon.tech/
services-that-combine-flavor-and-ai-are-a-new-food-tech-trend.
16. What is Aromyx?, AROMYX, https://www.aromyx.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
17. Catherine Lamb, Aromyx’s “Camera for Taste and Smell” Can Digitize Flavor,
SPOON, (Sept. 19, 2019), https://thespoon.tech/aromyxs-camera-for-taste-and-smell-can-
digitize-flavor.
18. Id.
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specificity to detail we have not reached before.
19
This technology and its 
potential impact will be the focus of this Note.
As technology around scents and flavors grows more impressive, com-
petitors in traditional markets across various industries and products contin-
ue selling a whole experience. Art exhibits are infusing the air of museums 
with unique scents to evoke emotions and trigger memories.
20
The clothing 
store Abercrombie & Fitch has long been known for its bold use of scent-
machines spewing cologne so strong, you could smell it from outside the 
store. The company recently rebranded, and with that rebranding came a 
fragrance change. The company turned to scent to help solidify its new 
identity, “hoping to draw in new customers and distance itself from associa-
tions of the oversexed A&F of yesteryear.”
21
Abercrombie & Fitch is not the only one capitalizing on scent experi-
ence. In fact, there are companies dedicated entirely to ambient scenting. 
They work with master perfumers to curate signature scents for hotels and 
retail stores that evoke the desired response from customers as they enter the 
space and that provide a unique branding opportunity.
22
The continued commercial use of scents for branding or user experi-
ence, paired with a revolutionary technological breakthrough in how we can 
analyze and manipulate these scents, could lead to a push for protection 
from the law. Because a patent is limited in duration and requires public 
disclosure of the invention in exchange for protection, trademark protection 
does not extend to functional marks, and trade secrets are vulnerable to re-
verse engineering, actors will look to other areas of intellectual property law 
to secure legal protection for their scent or flavor. I now briefly consider 
these options and then examine whether copyright protection extends to a 
scent or flavor.
19. “No one has ever been able to fully measure or quantify a smell, until Aromyx. 
Aromyx has developed a proprietary method to standardize and visualize the entire olfactory 
pattern of any given odorant substance, making this information actionable for customers. 
Aromyx analytics helps our customers understand unique sensory patterns of their product as 
it changes over time; the difference between products A and B; and contaminants or pathogen-
ic signatures indicating spoilage. This understanding enables optimization of production pro-
cesses and new product development.” Products, AROMYX, https://www.aromyx.com (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2020).
20. Jared Keller, Fear and Loathing at the Museum of Feelings, SMITHSONIAN MAG.,
(Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/fear-and-loathing-museum-
feelings-180957473.
21. Christopher Luu, Say Goodbye to the Scent of Fierce in Abercrombie & Fitch 
Stores, REFINERY 29 (July 16, 2017, 8:15 PM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2017/07/
163590/abercrombie-fitch-fierce-store-scent-change.
22. Mark Wilson, Confessions of a Store Smell Designer, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 11, 
2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3064512/confessions-of-a-store-smell-designer.
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II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OPTIONS FOR A SCENT OR FLAVOR
Legal protection of a scent or flavor can come from a variety of sources, 
including trademark, trade secret, patent and copyright law. Trademark law 
protects marks so that consumers can correctly identify the source of goods. 
Patents protect inventions and require novelty, usefulness, and non-
obviousness. Trade secret law helps protect certain information that derives 
value by virtue of it being secret. Copyright, by contrast, is a set of exclu-
sive rights relating to an original work of authorship and, like with patents, 
requires thinking about what the law seeks to promote in order to refrain 
from stifling innovation. This necessarily means that not all artistic or crea-
tive works will receive protection. Each of these legal doctrines would treat 
scent and flavor differently.
The Lanham Act
23
governs trademarks in the United States. The Act 
broadly defines trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof” that identifies and distinguishes the goods of one from 
those of another.
24
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated “it is the source-
distinguishing ability of a mark—not its ontological status as color, shape, 
fragrance, word, or sign—that permits it to serve these basic purposes.”
25
Although there are few limits on what is capable of serving as a trademark, 
there are only a few instances where a scent has done so.
26
23. Trademark Act (Lanham Act) of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2018).
24. Id. § 1127.
25. “Since human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost anything at all that 
is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is not restrictive.” Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). Additionally, only visually perceptible 
marks can be registered in certain countries, for example Mexico, France, Germany, and Bra-
zil. Charles Cromin, Lost and Found: Intellectual Property of the Fragrance Industry; From 
Trade Secret to Trade Dress, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L., 257, 284, 287 (2015).
26. In In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990), the USPTO granted trade-
mark registration to an applicant for the scent of sewing thread and embroidery yarn. The 
mark was described as “a high impact, fresh, floral fragrance reminiscent of Plumeria blos-
soms.” Id. at 1238-39 The applicant declared that dealers and distributors had come to recog-
nize the brand as the source of scented embroidery products and also noted that other produc-
ers could adopt different scents for their products. In this way, applicant’s fragrance presented 
no obstacle to competitors who wanted to produce scented embroidery products. Id. Im-
portantly, “the presence of scent on weaving material provided no utilitarian advantage,” and 
the USPTO found that it served only to distinguish the yarn from others. Olivia Su, Odor in 
the Courts - Extending Copyright Protection to Perfumes May Not Be So Nonscentsical: An
Investigation of the Legal Bulwarks Available for Fine Fragrances amid Advancing Reverse 
Engineering Technology, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 663, 689 (2014).
In 2018, Hasbro registered a trademark with the USPTO for the smell of Play-Doh. 
Hasbro Trademarks a Favorite Smell from Childhood: The PLAY-DOH Scent, HASBRO (May 
18, 2018), https://newsroom.hasbro.com/news-releases/news-release-details/hasbro-
trademarks-favorite-smell-childhood-play-doh-scent. The mark is described in its registration 
as the “scent of a sweet, slightly musky, vanilla fragrance, with slight overtones of cherry,
combined with the smell of a salted, wheat-based dough.” Registration No. 5467089, USPTO, 
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=doc&state=4810:irm2m8.2.1 (last visited Mar. 21, 
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Trademark protection does not extend to “matter that, as a whole, is 
functional.”
27
A scent or flavor mark would only pass the functionality bar if 
it were not attached to a product where smell or taste is essential to the 
product’s use.
28
Accordingly, the scent of a perfume or taste of a food would 
not qualify as a source-identifying trademark
29
and are instead better viewed 
as characteristics of the product. In New York Pizzeria, Inc. v. Syal,30 for ex-
ample, a restaurant chain claimed a competitor had copied the flavor of 
some of its dishes and brought a trademark infringement action. The court, 
despite noting that, in theory, a flavor could function as a trademark, denied 
the pizzeria’s claim to trademark protection of their food’s flavor. The court 
explained this was due in part to the fact that a flavor must have acquired 
distinctiveness or “secondary meaning,”
31
but was mostly because of the 
functional aspect that flavor plays in a food product. Functionality is a high 
hurdle for flavor marks.
32
Specifically, the court noted that the “flavor of 
food undoubtedly affects its quality, and is therefore a functional element of 
the product.”
33
The functionality doctrine “ensures that protection for utili-
2020). The amount of evidence required to prove that a scent functions as a trademark is sub-
stantial. It is costly to establish acquired distinctiveness among consumers and difficult to pass 
the nonfunctional requirement. Hasbro’s claim that it had used the mark for sixty-two years, 
on its own, was insufficient to allow registration. The company had to make an extensive 
showing of advertising expenditures, gather affidavits from consumers and dealers, and more 
to prove that the scent had acquired distinctiveness. Response to Office Action at 6, U.S. 
Trademark Application Serial No. 87/335,817 (filed Nov. 27, 2017), http://tsdr.uspto.gov/
documentviewer?caseId=sn87335817&docId=ROA20171128174227#docIndex=11&page=6.
A similar description with words of a scent mark would not be sufficiently defined for 
registration in the EU given that word descriptions are highly subjective and only one scent 
mark is registered to date. Dennemeyer & Associates SA, The Scent of a Trademark: 
Removal of Graphic Representability Requirement, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e797fb9e-1b9d-4fc6-b24a-823a020d8690.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2018).
28. For a complete analysis of how a digital scent or flavor could exist as a valid 
trademark in relation to products where taste and smell are perceived with the product, but not 
tied completely to the product’s use (i.e. medicines, dental floss, envelopes), see generally 
Cross, supra note 4, at 355.
29. See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1202.13 (Oct. 2018) 
[hereinafter TMEP] (“Just as with a scent or fragrance, a flavor can never be inherently dis-
tinctive because it is generally seen as a characteristic of the goods.”).
30. See New York Pizzeria, Inc. v. Syal, 56 F. Supp. 3d 875, 880-81 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
31. Id. at 881 (“As with colors, it is unlikely that flavors can ever be inherently distinc-
tive, because they do not ‘automatically’ suggest a product’s source. [. . .] It is therefore only 
when a flavor has acquired distinctiveness, or ‘secondary meaning’—that is, when customers 
have learned to associate the flavor with its source—that it has any chance of serving as a val-
id trademark.”).
32. See id. at 882 (“If the hurdle is high for trademarks when it comes to the flavor of 
medicine, it is far higher—and possibly insurmountable—in the case of food. People eat, of 
course, to prevent hunger. But the other main attribute of food is its flavor, especially restau-
rant food for which customers are paying a premium beyond what it would take to simply sat-
isfy their basic hunger needs.”).
33. Id.
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tarian product features be properly sought through a limited-duration utility 
patent, and not through the potentially unlimited protection of a trademark 
registration.”
34
In the rare instances where a scent or flavor is non-functional and can 
serve as a valid trademark, the digitization technology may prove a useful 
tool. Developing a way to categorize scent and flavor through digitization 
can be seen as analogous to the Pantone system for color. A proprietor could 
use digitization of their scent or flavor mark to more accurately put competi-
tors on notice as to the exact bounds and parameters of the protected trade-
mark. Instead of a word description of the scent mark of Play-Doh, for ex-
ample, digitizing would allow marks to more clearly define the scope of 
their protection to competitors, just as the Pantone system does for color.
Flavors can receive protection through the patent system.
35
The U.S. Pa-
tent Act grants limited duration protection to new and useful inventions, in-
cluding compositions of matter, that are novel and non-obvious.
36
A patent 
gives the patentee “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering 
for sale, or selling the invention” for a term of twenty years.
37
There are a few factors that would likely prevent many scents and fla-
vors from being patented. Because patents are only available to non-obvious
inventions, mere combinations of scents and flavors that exist in nature 
might not meet that threshold and thus would be excluded from protection. 
Securing a patent is also expensive and time-consuming. The cost and effort 
of hiring a patent attorney is another practical barrier. In addition to the risk 
that an application for a patent of a scent or flavor would be denied after 
substantial effort, there is the fact that patents are disclosed to the public in 
exchange for the limited protection. These considerations might lead actors 
seeking protection of a scent or flavor to pursue another route, such as trade 
secret law.
Most states in the United States have adopted the Uniform Trade Se-
crets Act (“UTSA”), which defines a trade secret as information that derives 
economic value from its being kept secret and that is subject to reasonable 
efforts of maintaining its secrecy.
38
One well-known example of a recipe 
34. TMEP, supra note 29, § 1202.02(a)(ii).
35. For example, a patent was registered for a meat flavor composition, described as 
follows: “This invention relates to novel artificial meaty flavoring compositions and to pro-
cesses for preparing them. More specifically, it relates to novel compositions having meaty 
flavor characteristics such as beef, pork and poultry flavor, compositions from which they 
may be prepared, methods for preparing them and to novel food compositions containing 
them.” U.S. Patent No. 3,519,437 col. 1 l. 20 (issued Jul. 7, 1970). Another patent was granted 
to chocolate-flavor compositions, described as “[n]ovel compositions of matter possessing a 
chocolatelike flavor and aroma, consisting essentially of a blend of certain sulfides” U.S. Pa-
tent No. 3,619,210 abstract (issued Nov. 9, 1971).
36. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2018).
37. Id. §154(a).
38. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
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protected by trade secret is the flavor of Coca-Cola. Throughout the compa-
ny’s history, efforts to keep the formula secret included never writing it 
down, sharing the recipe with a limited number of personnel who are not 
permitted to travel on the same plane, and locking the formula in bank 
vaults for decades.
39
Coca-Cola certainly makes “reasonable efforts” to 
maintain its flavor’s secrecy. Kentucky Fried Chicken is also known to pro-
tect its secret recipe of eleven herbs and spices for its chicken flavor in a 
vault.
40
Like patenting, protecting flavor through trade secrecy is expensive, 
but it is also powerful since it lasts as long as the secret is kept.
41
The UTSA creates a right to bring an action for misappropriation of a 
trade secret, but there is nothing preventing competitors from reverse-
engineering a particular recipe, process, etc., typically considered a trade 
secret. The enormous amount of manipulation and data that can be extracted 
from a scent or flavor through digitization threatens the protection that trade 
secret law provides, potentially weakening the doctrine’s ability to protect 
coveted scents and flavors.
For these reasons, actors would be inclined to pursue copyright protec-
tion if such protection were to extend to scents and flavors. The duration of 
copyright protection is longer than that of patent protection. Copyright does 
not require public disclosure of the actor’s process/method/composition of a 
scent or flavor and it offers protection from reverse engineering. Additional-
ly, the functionality bar is not dispositive in copyright in the way that it is in 
trademark. Considering the advantages copyright could afford, I will discuss 
copyright protection for a scent or flavor in the next section.
III. COPYRIGHT FOR A SCENT OR FLAVOR
A. Copyright Law Origins and Foundation
Copyright is effectively a temporary monopoly facilitated through 
granting certain exclusive rights: to reproduce that work, to distribute copies 
of that work, to perform or display the work publicly, and to prepare deriva-
39. Coca-Cola’s Formula Is at the World of Coca-Cola, COCA-COLA COMPANY 
https://www.coca-colacompany.com/news/coca-cola-formula-is-at-the-world-of-coca-cola 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
40. Jay Jones, KFC Recipe Revealed? Tribune Shown Family Scrapbook with 11 Herbs 
and Spices, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 19, 2016, 12:36PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/travel/ct-
kfc-recipe-revealed-20160818-story.html.
41. Coca-Cola successfully sued an employee who attempted to share proprietary in-
formation, including new product samples, with competitor PepsiCo. Pepsi actually tipped off 
Coca-Cola when they were contacted by the employee’s middle man, prompting Coca-Cola to 
bring in the FBI and showing how even the fiercest industry competitors respect the im-
portance of trade secrets. Zachary Crockett, The Botched Coca-Cola Heist of 2006, HUSTLE
(Apr. 28, 2018), https://thehustle.co/coca-cola-stolen-recipe.
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tive works based on the original.
42
The rights granted in the EU and the 
United States are effectively the same.
43
Copyright subsists automatically 
from the moment of creation; there is no requirement to register or apply for 
copyright protection.
44
The historical development of copyright law created two distinguisha-
ble systems of protection in the United States and the EU. The United States 
focuses on utilitarian values. The system balances incentivizing authors to 
create and publish more works on the one hand and facilitating the dissemi-
nation of works to the public on the other. The purpose of copyright is to 
promote welfare for the public good with the assumption that reading, see-
ing, and hearing more works benefits society. The balance must be socially 
advantageous – meaning that the benefits of granting copyright to authors 
must be greater than the costs of granting exclusive rights that impede the 
free flow of information to society broadly.
The EU system, by contrast, is known as an “author’s rights” (not “cop-
yright”) system. It favors protecting the “personhood” or “personality” of 
the author and puts more emphasis on protecting the work an author puts in. 
These rights are seen as natural rights; the author’s creation and control 
should be up to them, not publishers or other players.
Copyright protection in the United States comes from the Constitution. 
The Constitution grants Congress the authority to “promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inven-
tors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”
45
In 
1790, Congress enacted the Copyright Act (“the Act”), which articulates 
that copyright protection is afforded to “original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”
46
The United States and the EU are both signatories of the Berne Conven-
tion treaty (“BC”). Each country has its own copyright law regime, but all 
countries are limited by the BC. The BC protects “literary and artistic 
works”
47
in enumerated categories similar to those of the U.S. Copyright 
Act.
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
43. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 8,-9, 
11–14, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
44. See id. art. 5(2) (“The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be sub-
ject to any formality.”).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
47. Berne Convention, supra note 43, art. 2. The United States is also a signatory to the 
Berne Convention.
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Directive 2001/29/EC (the “Information Society Directive”)
48
is an im-
portant Directive that was implemented to harmonize aspects of copyright 
law across the EU. Neither the BC nor the Information Society Directive 
provide a definition for a “work,” so it is up to the member states to define 
the term for themselves. A “work” in the EU is typically understood as an 
“intellectual creation.”
49
B. Subject Matter and Elements
To receive copyright protection, a work must be of the proper subject 
matter
50
and meet certain requirements, including restrictions calibrated to 
fit certain subject matter categories. The Act enumerates eight categories of
copyrightable subject matter,
51
none of which explicitly encompass scent or 
flavor. Congress clearly intended the list to be illustrative (in theory, scent 
or flavor could be included);
52
for practical purposes, however, it is treated 
48. Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167).
49. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 17 (1978) (“[T]he Convention speaks of 
‘works’ but nowhere defines what is meant by the word. But it is clear from its general tone 
that these must be intellectual creations (the words appear in paragraph (5) of Article 2).”).
50. This Note discusses copyright protection for a scent or flavor alone, but see Malla 
Pollack, Note, Intellectual Property Protection for the Creative Chef, or How to Copyright a 
Cake: A Modest Proposal, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477 (1991), for a full discussion around 
protection of a food item in its entirety. The protection of an entire food dish seems more akin 
to the category of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works and would thus find itself limited by 
the useful articles doctrine, posing a significant problem for foodstuffs. The technology digit-
izing scent allows for separation of the flavor from the food and creates fixation in something 
different than the food item.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018) ((1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any ac-
companying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes 
and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works).
52. Ellii Cho, Note, Copyright or Trade Dress? Toward IP Protection of Multisensory 
Effect Designs for Immersive Virtual Environments, CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 801, 815-16
(2016) (“Moreover, the Copyright Act and its legislative history reflect foresight and intent to 
expand the scope of copyrightable subject matter to accommodate future technological ad-
vances as well as to avoid absolute preclusion of materials that previously considered unsuita-
ble for copyright . . . Furthermore, the House Report suggests that the subject matter of copy-
right may be expanded to include ‘those which scientific discoveries and technological 
developments have made possible new forms of creative expression that never existed before,’
and [ ] those ‘in existence for generations or centuries [but that] have only gradually come to 
be recognized as creative and worthy of protection.’ Both of these categories leave open the 
possibility to of embracing works that appeal to taste, touch, and smell as copyrightable sub-
ject matter.”).
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as exhaustive.
53
The BC’s protected categories of work are similar to those 
protected and enumerated by U.S. copyright law.
54
Beyond falling into one of the above subject matter categories, a work 
must also meet the following requirements: (1) constitute an original work 
of authorship; (2) be fixed in a tangible medium of expression (the BC 
leaves it up to the signatory countries to decide whether “works in general 
or any specified categories of works shall not be protected unless they have 
been fixed in some material form”
55
); and (3) extend to expression, not an 
idea (a negative requirement that works to exclude certain works from pro-
tection). Together these are the three elements of originality, fixation, and 
the idea-expression dichotomy.
The subject matter listed in the BC is an exhaustive list, but the treaty 
sets the minimum standard of protection to which signatories must adhere. 
This means that countries are free to go beyond what is stated in the treaty 
and extend protection, for example, to scents. In general, both U.S. and EU 
jurisdictions’ subject matter categories appeal to the higher senses of sight 
and sound.
The EU member states have varying subject matter requirements. The 
Dutch Copyright Act does not include an exhaustive list of subject matter.
56
Any work that is perceptible and original may qualify. This led the Dutch 
High Court in 2006
57
to rule that the scent of a perfume was, in principle, 
copyrightable, “even if only perceptible through the nose.”
58
“The Court dis-
tinguished the scent of a perfume from its recipe or the liquid containing it, 
comparing the latter to the paper of a book, which is not subject matter of 
copyright, whereas the content of the book is.”
59
France, on the other hand, 
came to the opposite conclusion in 2006. In Bsiri-Barbir v. Haarmann & 
Reimer, the court held that the manufacture of a perfume did not meet re-
quirements for copyright protection as it involved only technical 
knowledge.
60
The U.S. Copyright Act allows for new technological forms of embod-
iment of works. It “has been drafted in ways that would allow courts and the 
53. Anthony R. Reese, Copyrightable Subject Matter in the “Next Great Copyright 
Act,” 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1489, 1499 (2015).
54. See Berne Convention, supra note 43, art. 2(1) (“The expression ‘literary and artis-
tic works’ shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, what-
ever may be the mode or form of its expression.”).
55. Id. art. 2(2).
56. Kamiel Koelman, Copyright in the Courts: Perfume as Artistic Expression?, 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Sept. 2006), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/05/
article_0001.html.
57. HR 16 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 585 m.nt. JHS (Kecofa/Lancôme) (Neth.).
58. Koelman, supra note 56.
59. Id.
60. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Paris, civ., June 13, 
2006, Bull. civ. I, No. 30 (Fr.).
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Copyright Office to recognize as copyrightable types of subject matter that 
Congress did not expressly enumerate in the statute.”
61
This has not hap-
pened for scent or flavor. The U.S. Copyright Office, in fact, took the posi-
tion that the Act grants flexibility in interpreting the scope of what can be 
included in the categories, but that it does not grant authority to create a 
new subject matter category.62 As such, the Copyright Office will not regis-
ter claims of copyright in material outside these categories. An author must 
wait for the Copyright Office to act, one way or another, on their application 
before bringing a lawsuit.
63
If the Copyright Office refuses registration, a 
party can still bring an infringement lawsuit but must give notice and copy 
of the complaint to the Register of Copyrights, allowing the Office oppor-
tunity to join as a party to the action.
64
Congress could add a category to the 
list, as it did with architectural works in 1990, and, in theory, the Copyright
Office could register a scent outside the subject matter list. For now, it 
seems safe to say that because scent and flavor do not fall into any of the 
enumerated categories, authors of such works will have trouble exercising 
their copyright in the United States.
Few cases in the United States “touch on the issue of whether tastes and 
scents are copyrightable.”
65
Various theories explain this phenomenon. 
Among the theories is a view that “lower sense”
66
works are not art, an issue 
with the inherent functionality of scent and flavor, and a belief that scents 
and flavors are not sufficiently fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
67
61. Reese, supra note 53, at 1517.
62. Id. at 1520 (citing Registration of Claims to Copyright, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,605, 
37,607 (June 22, 2012)).
63. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892
(2019) (“[W]e conclude that ‘registration . . . has been made’ within the meaning of 17 U. S. 
C. §411(a) not when an application for registration is filed, but when the Register has regis-
tered a copyright after examining a properly filed application.”).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2018).
65. Leon Calleja, Why Copyright Law Lacks Taste and Scents, 21 U. GA. J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1, 3 (2013).
66. Scent and taste are known as the “lower senses” as compared to sight and sound, 
the “upper senses.” Some argue that, historically, a preference has been expressed for works 
of the upper senses, i.e. visual art and music. An interesting reason for this distinction in as-
sessing what is considered art is that the experience of lower sense works happens more pri-
vately; each person smells or tastes something by an putting the scent or flavor inside their 
body. By contrast, visual art and sounds are expressed and experienced in a more public way, 
with separation between the person viewing/hearing them and the work itself. For a full dis-
cussion on this, see id. at 3-4, 18, 21; see also J. Austin Broussard, An Intellectual Property 
Food Fight: Why Copyright Law Should Embrace Culinary Innovation, 10 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 691, 724 (2008) (arguing that the “vision-centric language of the Copyright Act 
makes evident . . . the bias of philosophy and law against the ‘lower’ senses.”). Calleja does 
not believe that prejudice against lower sense works is what keeps perfumes and food dishes 
from being copyrightable but instead focuses more on the issue of functionality; since all food 
functions to be eaten and scents function to be smelled, they are not copyrightable. Calleja, 
supra note 65, at 30.
67. Calleja, supra note 65, at 3-4.
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The EU, on the other hand, has had a number of significant cases involving 
scent and flavor, and recently explored the bounds of subject matter catego-
ries.
In 2017, the Dutch Appeal Court confronted the question of whether a 
cheese flavor falls within the scope of copyright protection in Levola Heng-
elo BV v. Smilde Foods.68 The court referred a number of questions to the 
CJEU including whether copyright protection is precluded by the fact that 
the examples of “literary and artistic works” in the BC list only creations 
that can be perceived by sight and sound. The Dutch court also asked the 
CJEU to rule on whether the instability of a food product and/or the subjec-
tive nature of its taste precluded it from being eligible for copyright protec-
tion.
Again, Member States are free to expand beyond the minimum standard 
of works to be protected under the BC. Not all Member States would extend 
protection to the flavor of a cheese.
69
Some states would likely see the issue 
as falling more within the realm of industrial or even trademark or design 
protection. These states would say protecting the flavor of a cheese is about 
protecting a firm’s product, less so about artistic value. The question in 
Levola regarding the objectivity of the expression (the identification of a 
food’s flavor) is better seen as a factual question on which a court must rule 
rather than a legal question about copyrightability. Some would point out 
that if a scent or flavor does not fall into the proper category, it does not 
mean the scent or flavor is left without any sort of legal protection. It would 
just belong to “other domains, which fall within the realm of industrial 
property rights or which simply fall outside the (exceptional) IP system and 
thus are subject only to the (general) rules of freedom of competition.”
70
The Levola opinion, which ultimately denied protection to a cheese, 
was brief and failed to sufficiently answer the core question of what may 
qualify as a copyrightable work in the EU. The court stated, “[T]he subject 
68. Case C-310/17, Levola Hengelo BV v. Smilde Foods BV, 2018 EUR-Lex CELEX 
899 (Nov. 13, 2018).
69. See Eugénie Coche, HEKS’NKAAS at the CJEU: The End of a Cheese-War or the 
Beginning of a New Copyright Era?, WOLTERS KLUWER (June 26, 2018), 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2018/06/26/heksnkaas-cjeu-end-cheese-war-beginning-
new-copyright-era/?doing_wp_cron=1586456052.0751791000366210937500 (explaining 
how member states France and the United Kingdom, at oral argument in the Levola case, ar-
gued for the CJEU to preclude the copyrightability of taste); see also Caterina Sganga, Say
Nay to a Tastier Copyright: Why the CJEU Should Deny Copyright Protection to Tastes (and 
Smells), 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 187 (2018) (noting the fragmented national prece-
dents across the EU regarding admissibility of sensory copyright and that the “majority view 
has traditionally excluded that copyright could cover smell and taste, limiting its scope to 
works that can be perceived through sight and hearing”).
70. Euro. Copyright Soc’y, Opinion on the Pending Reference Before the CJEU in 
Case 310/17 (Copyright Protection of Tastes) at 4 (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/ecs-opinion-on-
protection-for-tastes-final1.pdf.
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matter protected by copyright must be expressed in a manner which makes 
it identifiable with sufficient precision and objectivity, even though that ex-
pression is not necessarily in permanent form.”
71
With its emphasis on precision and objectivity, the court opened the 
door for the technology discussed in this Note. Specifically, the court wrote:
The taste of a food product cannot, however, be pinned down with 
precision and objectivity. Unlike, for example, a literary, pictorial, 
cinematographic or musical work, which is a precise and objective 
form of expression, the taste of a food product will be identified es-
sentially on the basis of taste sensations and experiences, which are 
subjective and variable since they depend, inter alia, on factors par-
ticular to the person tasting the product concerned, such as age, 
food preferences and consumption habits, as well as on the envi-
ronment or context in which the product is consumed.
Moreover, it is not possible in the current state of scientific devel-
opment to achieve by technical means a precise and objective iden-
tification of the taste of a food product which enables it to be dis-
tinguished from the taste of other products of the same kind.
It must therefore be concluded, on the basis of all of the foregoing 
considerations, that the taste of a food product cannot be classified 
as a ‘work’ within the meaning of Directive 2001/29.
72
The Advocate General’s opinion in the Levola case stated “the ability to 
identify a work with sufficient precision and objectivity and, therefore, the 
scope of its copyright protection, is imperative in order to comply with the 
principle of legal certainty.”
73
Achieving an objective identification of the 
taste of a food by technical means is precisely what some of the technology 
discussed in this Note purports to do.
The Levola dicta regarding precision and objectivity is troubling. In 
contrast to trademark law, there is no copyright registry where artists can 
search and find whether others’ works are too similar to their own before 
they embark on making an intellectual creation. Objectivity and precision 
were never elements for copyright protection in the past, but the CJEU here
seemed to introduce them as necessary while ignoring the important ques-
tions referred to it by the Dutch court.
On the other hand, copyright is in the realm of intellectual property.
“The objective identification of property is, and should be, a universal con-
71. Levola Hengelo BV, 2018 EUR-Lex CELEX 899, ¶ 40.
72. Id. at ¶ 42-44.
73. Op. Advocate General ¶ 58, July 25, 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:618.
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dition.”
74
Perhaps there always has been some implicit degree of objectivity 
in the copyright calculation due to the fact that copyright is rooted in princi-
ples of property.
After Levola, the element of fixation together with these new factors of 
precision and objectivity, muddle the analysis of what is copyrightable in 
the EU. The court clearly requires a work to be objectively represented with 
precision in order to receive protection, but this might lead to a sort of de 
facto fixation requirement. This poses a problem because fixation is not a 
copyright requirement in all EU jurisdictions.
Regardless, it seems that copyright protection will not be granted to 
scents and flavors based on the current language of EU law. The Advocate 
General in Levola wrote: “I do not rule out the possibility that techniques 
may be developed in the future to enable the precise and objective identifi-
cation of a taste or a scent, which could lead to the legislature taking action 
to protect them using copyright, or other means.”
75
Thus, Levola allows for 
the possibility of copyright protection for a scent or flavor by digitization.
C. Originality
It is also important to consider the contours of the originality require-
ment because it might pose problems for copyrighting a scent or flavor. The 
U.S. Copyright Act protects original works of authorship but does not de-
fine the term “original.”
76
However, case law establishes a low standard for 
originality. This makes sense. We do not want judges imparting their sub-
jective opinion on a given work’s aesthetic merit. In the United States, the 
essence of copyright is not to reward authors for hard work but to promote 
progress of science and useful arts. The latter often means building on oth-
ers’ ideas and requires leaving certain works unprotected. The author’s sub-
stantial effort, also known as “sweat of the brow,” is never enough to render 
a work original. To be original, a work must owe its origin to the author (in-
dependent origin) and contain a level of creativity
77
that is beyond de mini-
mis.78
Copyright protection never extends to facts because facts are not “origi-
nal works of authorship”;
79
they do not owe their origin to the author. Facts 
must remain open to the public in order to promote the progress called for in 
the Constitution.
80
The originality element means protection is not available 
to a scent or taste of something occurring in nature because these are under-
74. Jani McCutcheon, Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV: The Hard Work of De-
fining a Copyright Work, 82 MOD. L. REV. 936, 945 (2019).
75. Op. Advocate General ¶ 58, July 25, 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:618.
76. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (2018).
77. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
78. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
80. See Feist, 499 U.S. 340 at 347; Calleja, supra note 65, at 7-8.
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stood as facts. However, there is an intelligible argument to be made that 
some scents or flavors can be original expression.
81
The Museum of Arts and Design in New York City houses an olfactory 
department dedicated in part to placing “scent as an artistic medium along-
side painting, sculpture and music.”
82
In a 2012 exhibit, “The Art of Scent 
1889-2012,” museumgoers experienced puffs of scent coming through the 
walls. This was the first exhibit to celebrate scent as an artistic medium. 
Museum curator Chandler Burr has stated that he has no problem seeing 
fragrances as artistic creations. In fact, in an interview with the New York 
Times, he reacted angrily to the idea of describing a scent based on what it is 
made of, i.e. a citrus scent. “I am completely opposed to this idiotic reduc-
tionism of works of olfactory art to their raw materials, which is as stupid as 
reducing a Frank Gehry building to the kind of metal, the kind of wood and 
the kind of glass that he used,” he said.
83
Human reaction to scent is usually an automatic emotional or physical 
response. Burr said a challenge he faced “was to get visitors to move be-
yond their initial emotional responses and memories and to think critically 
about scent design.”
84
The intricacies of fragrances and the emotions they 
can evoke do make it easy to take the leap and consider a scent an intellec-
tual creation full of originality.
85
However creative scent design may be, 
simply being an art form is not enough to guarantee a scent or flavor copy-
right protection. There are, of course, other requirements and considerations 
buried within the legal doctrine.
The BC considers copyrightable works to be “intellectual creations” but 
does not define this term. It remains up to member states
86
to expand on 
originality, but Directive 2001/29/EC (the “Information Society Directive”)
promoted harmonization of the originality standard across the EU.
87
EU 
Member States define originality with more emphasis on the author’s per-
81. For a full analysis of why food should receive copyright protection, see Pollack, 
supra note 50.




84. Jimmy Stamp, The First Major Museum Show to Focus on Smell, SMITHSONIAN 
MAG., (Jan. 16, 2013), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-first-major-
museum-show-to-focus-on-smell-1787124.
85. Id.
86. Thomas Margoni, The Harmonisation of EU Copyright Law: The Originality 
Standard 23 (June 29, 2016) (unpublished paper) (on file with the Social Science Research 
Network) (“However, it will be a matter for national courts to establish whether a specific 
work meets the ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ definition. In so doing it is safe to assume 
that courts will be guided – consciously or unconsciously – by their own traditional legal 
constructions.”), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802327. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.
2802327.
87. Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167); Margoni, supra note 86, at 10.
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sonality (Germany: personal intellectual creations; France: “oeuvre de 
l’esprit”; Italy: works of ingenuity of creative character; United Kingdom: 
author’s own – owing origin to author, historically including sweat of the 
brow
88
). In general, the EU considers whether the author made free and cre-
ative choices. Indeed, originality centers around the idea of an “author’s
own intellectual creation.”
89
There has historically been variety in the way EU member states define 
originality and consider factors like the level of creativity and the effort put 
into a work. In Germany, the “Birthday Train” case sets the standard of 
originality for copyrighted works at “a degree of creativity which allows, 
from the view of a public open to art and sufficiently skilled in ideas of art, 
to be called an ‘artistic’ performance.”
90
The CJEU opinion in Football 
Dataco Ltd v. Yahoo! addressed whether an author’s intellectual creation 
requires more than significant skill and labor.
91
The United Kingdom had 
followed the common law’s general interpretation of originality as being the 
author’s own – “originat[ing] with its author” – and encompassed the degree 
of skill and labor involved.
92
The CJEU ultimately denied the same degree 
of relevance to the “sweat of the brow” in defining originality, going against 
the way the United Kingdom had previously defined originality.
93
All things considered, it is easy to imagine a scent or a flavor meeting 
the originality standard in the United States or the EU. With his museum 
exhibit, Burr showed that a fragrance should be considered creative and ar-
tistic. Protection may never be given to a natural scent or flavor, but a com-
plex fragrance or flavor created by an author as the product of their intellect 
would have no problem meeting the originality requirement in either juris-
diction.
D. Fixation
There is no issue regarding whether a scent or flavor can be fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression (a scent in a perfume, a taste in a food). 
Moreover, scent and flavor can also easily exist for a period of time long 
88. Margoni, supra note 86, at 23.
89. Id. at 8.
90. Bardehle Pagenberg, German Federal Supreme Court: Relationship Between Na-
tional Copyright Law and National and/or European Design Law (Decision of November 13, 
2013 – Case I ZR 143/12 – Geburtstagszug/Birthday Train), LEXOLOGY, (Mar. 24, 2014), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=347fb9e3-0348-4af9-b7cf-ed1d7449dbf0.
91. Case C-604/10, Football Dataco Ltd. v. Yahoo! UK Ltd., 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX 
115, ¶ 25 (Mar. 1, 2012).
92. Margoni, supra note 86, at 10.
93. Id. at 24; Football Dataco Ltd., 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX 115, ¶ 46 (holding that 
“the significant labour and skill required for setting up that database cannot as such justify 
such a protection if they do not express any originality in the selection or arrangement”).
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enough to fit the “more than transitory duration”
94
requirement in the United 
States, even without digitization. Perfume scents and food flavors last for 
hours. However, both are subject to degradation over time: Leftovers do not 
always taste the same days later, and a perfume can wear off by the end of 
the day. Constant change over time from degradation could be an issue 
when a scent or flavor is fixed in the mediums of perfumes or foods.
In Kelley v. Chicago Park District,95 the Seventh Circuit dealt with the 
copyrightability of an outdoor wildflower display (essentially a garden). 
Over time, the garden inevitably fell victim to forces of nature despite at-
tempts to maintain it. Given the ever-changing nature of plant life cycles, 
the court held the artist had no claim to copyright protection because a “gar-
den’s constituent elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed” in 
the sense required for copyright protection.
96
Although the Kelley decision has been criticized,97 if a court can hold a 
garden is not sufficiently fixed for copyright, then it is easy to see how a 
court could likewise consider a scent or flavor to be too ephemeral. The new 
digitization technology purports to resolve this issue, allowing a more accu-
rate and permanent method of fixation and essentially preserving a scent or 
taste indefinitely.
The BC does not require the element of fixation in a tangible medium 
of expression. This leaves it up to Member States. Regardless of whether 
there is a fixation requirement, it is likely that the analysis would conclude 
the same way in the EU as in the United States. The technology that digitiz-
es scent and flavor, though unnecessary, provides a superior medium of fix-
ation.
The element of fixation when it comes to scent and flavor poses another 
issue. The tangible medium of expression normally required by scent or fla-
vor is food or perfume, and these mediums leave no room for separability 
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression 
when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is suf-
ficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated for a period of more than transitory duration.”).
95. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
96. Id. at 304.
97. See, e.g., Dawn Leung, A Fixation on Moral Rights – The Implications of Kelley v. 
Chicago Park District for Copyright and VARA Protection, 4 ARIZ. ST. U. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
1, 24-25 (2014) (“The order of thought as literally expressed in the statute seems to suggest 
that a work cannot be perceived ‘for more than a transitory duration’ unless it is sufficiently 
‘permanent or stable.’ Another way of saying this is that the work must be ‘permanent or sta-
ble’ enough to be perceived for ‘more than a transitory duration’ . . . The Court in Kelley 
seems to potentially contradict this more literal reading of the statute by treating the two ideas 
the other way around, if not completely separately.”); Kat Kubis, Uncertain Future for Con-
ceptual Art, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. JETLAW (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.jetlaw.org/
2011/04/14/uncertain-future-for-conceptual-art; Court: Not All Conceptual Art May Be Copy-
righted, CLANCCO (Feb. 16, 2011), http://clancco.com/wp/2011/02/vara_moral-rights_
sculpture_originality.
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between the scent or flavor’s expression and its function.
98
This will be dis-
cussed next.
E. Idea-Expression Dichotomy and Separability
The idea-expression dichotomy is the most important element in the 
discussion surrounding the copyrightability of scent and flavor. Copyright 
law constantly seeks to find the right balance between incentivizing creation 
by protecting works on the one hand and promoting progress by allowing 
the public broad access to more works on the other. One way that copyright 
law works to achieve this balance is by mandating that only the expression
of a work is protected; ideas embedded within a work are not.99
For sculptural works, more specifically, copyright grants authors tem-
porary monopoly over the non-utilitarian expressions of their original work 
of authorship in order to “facilitate the introduction of ideas into the public 
domain.”
100
Thus, copyright protection does not extend to aspects of a work 
that are functionally necessary to the work itself. Protection in this area 
would unquestionably prevent others from expanding on a given idea. If a 
particular expression of an idea is required to create the work, then it is con-
sidered functional, and protecting that functional expression would inevita-
bly cross over into protecting the idea.101 Thus, there is no separability and 
the idea and expression are said to merge.
There are further limits on the scope of copyright protection for certain 
subject matter categories.
102
An obvious take on defining the function of a 
food’s flavor is that it serves to provide sustenance and to be tasted. If we 
consider the flavor together with the food item, a dish seems to fit best un-
der the subject matter category of a sculptural work,
103
making it fall under 
the useful articles doctrine.
104
However, a fair challenge to applying the use-
ful articles doctrine is “that there is nothing functional that dictates the con-
98. Calleja, supra note 65, at 30 (“Because both the dish and the perfume necessarily 
require immediate bodily contact with these works to access the artist’s expression, neither 
can escape the inherent privacy and incommunicable aspects attached to the perceiver’s con-
templation of the work. As such, they both lack a ‘public enlightenment’ component that justi-
fies the need to extend copyright protection to these works. Moreover, neither a culinary dish 
nor a fragrance can avoid their inherent utilitarian functions of pleasing the palate or olfactory 
senses of their perceivers.”).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2018) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . . In 
no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea[.]”
(emphasis added)).
100. Calleja, supra note 65, at 18.
101. See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
102. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 112-122 (2018).
103. See id. § 113 (sculptural works useful article exception).
104. Useful article is defined as an article having “intrinsic utilitarian function.” Id. §
101.
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tent of striped bass wrapped in potato with a Barolo wine sauce or maple-
bacon ice cream.”
105
It is true that menu items in some of the world’s most 
elite restaurants are focused on providing an experience and presenting an 
artistic creation for the patron to enjoy, maybe even more so than they are 
focused on the taste of the food.
106
Regardless of whether chefs are more fo-
cused on providing an experience, the narrow aspect of flavor (not the entire 
dish) undeniably plays a functional role in food. Furthermore, there may 
have been only one way (the recipe) to express the idea (the flavor). Copy-
right law protects the form, not the function, of a work.
Separability is particularly important with scents and flavors because 
humans might have a difficult time discerning between similar flavors. If so, 
then granting copyright protection for scents and flavors would be more 
likely to suppress competition and innovation. For example, if the limited 
monopoly granted through copyright applies to a strawberry flavor of yo-
gurt, it could foreclose too broad a spectrum of that flavor from use. The 
idea of that strawberry yogurt flavor merges with its expression. However, 
this restriction holds less weight if with time we come to understand that the 
human ability to discern between scents and flavors is more expansive than 
we thought. Digitization might provide a means for humans to better train 
and exercise these senses.
To the extent that a scent or flavor is its own work instead of blended 
together with an entire food dish under the sculptural work subject matter 
category, there are other options. The scent or flavor might deserve either its 
own category or be better suited under the literary works category (a digit-
ized scent or flavor as software). To the extent that a given flavor is attached 
to the food and thus the constraints of the sculptural works category (such as 
the useful articles doctrine), the flavor still arguably should not be barred 
from protection for being functional. This is because the protection sought is 
for the fixed aesthetic flavor experience, not the entire dish. The experience 
of a flavor should be viewed as an original sensory expression separate from 
the food item experience. Digitization propels this separation between flavor 
and food.
105. CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN & KAL RAUSTIALA, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY:
HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 68 (2012).
106. Today, “extreme culinary innovation” puts forth dishes that “push the envelope of 
good taste; a few even are bizarre and arguably inedible.” Id. at 62-63. This niche market of 
the culinary scene might speak more to food as visual art, however, and is thus beyond the 
scope of this Note’s focus on flavor, only one of multiple aspects in a dish (texture, tempera-
ture, presentation being some others).
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F. Synthesizing the Elements
As discussed with regard to originality, copyright protection will never 
be given to a flavor that occurs naturally, like that of a fruit.
107
Originality in 
flavor becomes more complicated when we think of a cheese artisan creat-
ing a block of parmesan through an intricate, creative method. Would the 
resulting cheese flavor be considered as occurring in nature? One might 
conclude that copyright protection for a food would only extend to more 
synthetic flavors resulting from complex recipes and processes that require a 
certain degree of creative input from the author. This runs into the problem 
in both the United States and the EU that sweat of the brow is not sufficient 
to warrant protection. Here, the process of making a flavor might find ref-
uge in patent law, not copyright. The question at the center of this Note is 
not how to protect the method this new technology employs to create a dig-
itized scent or flavor; that is a question for patent law. The question is 
whether the technology somehow changes the analysis of scent or flavor 
copyrightability.
Modern society is prepared to call chefs, artists
108
; they are undoubtedly 
as creative as painters and writers.
109
Their dishes are often considered an 
artistic experience. It is clear by looking at photos of the dishes that a chef 
indisputably “creates” a flavor with significant original input. But this can-
not change the fact that a flavor will inherently play a functional role when 
the means of expression is a food item.
The treatment of recipes offers insight into the copyrightability of a 
dish. Courts and the U.S. Copyright Office have held that recipes
110
– mere 
107. In the United States, this comes from the requirement that works be created by a 
human being. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). In the 
EU, this comes from the fact that originality requires a degree of creativity that is the author’s
own intellectual creation. Ana Ramalho, Ex Machina, Ex Autore? Machines that Create and 




108. In her note from 1991, Pollack persuasively advances why food should be consid-
ered an art form and sets forth an argument for why food items should be copyrightable as 
such. Pollack, supra note 50.
109. SPRIGMAN & RAUSTIALA, supra note 105, at 59 (“For millennia, chefs throughout 
the world have labored to create delicious food. Yet for most of that history they labored in 
obscurity. . . . [C]hefs were rarely treated as artists on par with their peers in the visual or lit-
erary arts. . . . Today, of course, star chefs seem to be everywhere.”).
110. Cho discusses virtual reality employing various senses in creating scenes, in partic-
ular the application of copyright and recipes in the context of virtual reality: “In Publications 
International. Ltd. V. Meredith Corp., the Seventh Circuit concluded that the compilation of 
Dannon Yogurt recipes is copyright eligible, but not the individual recipes . . . . The court dis-
tinguished between functional and creative elements and categorized individual recipes as 
functional. In applying the Meredith court’s reasoning to VR multisensory schemes, it is the 
compilation of various sensory effects, rather than the individual sensory elements, that neces-
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listings of ingredients – are statements of fact and thus not subject to copy-
right protection.
111
Moreover, copyright protection does not extend to dishes 
themselves because a dish functions to be consumed.
112
The EU comes to 
the same conclusion.
113
For dishes to be copyrightable, they “must be suffi-
ciently expressive and not merely functional combinations of tastes.”
114
This 
has been the heart of the problem before digitization. “Consequently, the 
utilitarian aspects associated with works derived from taste necessarily sub-
sume their artistic expressiveness,”
115
and thus the work’s expression and its 
use are said to merge. The inherent appeal to the subjective interests of the 
person experiencing the taste or smell is “inescapably driven by their utili-
tarian function”
116
and for that reason, recipes and dishes are not afforded 
copyright protection.
117
Analogous reasoning can be applied to a fragrance.
Scholars have advanced the argument that recipes are not so different, 
or should not be, from another work that copyright law protects – sheet mu-
sic. At its heart, sheet music is nothing more than a set of instructions.
118
To 
some, the treatment of food and fashion by the law (the useful articles doc-
trine) is quite dull: “We eat food because we are hungry, and the qualities of 
a dish are thought to be dictated by functionality, not aesthetics.”
119
Like-
wise, “the law deems the dress a useful article, effectively the same as a 
smock.”
120
Regardless of convincing criticism, these limiting doctrines advance the 
argument that there is no tangible medium of expression for a scent or taste 
sitates copyright protection. . . . Just as ‘[t]he identification of ingredients necessary for the 
preparation of each dish is a statement of facts,’ and thereby precluded from copyright protec-
tion, a mere use of a particular sensory effect would not be copyright eligible. Instead, a VR 
designer could reasonably argue that the particular, unique sequence and arrangement of mul-
tisensory effects and the creative expression that results from such design overcome the idea-
expression dichotomy.”
Cho, supra note 52, at 817-18 (emphasis in original).
111. Publ’ns Int’l v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996); Calleja, supra 
note 65, at 11.
112. Calleja, supra note 65, at 13-14.
113. Benjamin Beck & Konstantin von Werder, Your IP Valentine: Can Recipes Be Pro-
tected by Copyright?, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 14 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=bcf1b075-c275-4461-abcd-877819c64238.
114. Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas 
Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1156
(2007).
115. Calleja, supra note 65, at 14.
116. Id. at 14, 28.
117. Cho, supra note 52, at 814 (“Copyright law shelters only works that appeal to 
‘high’ senses, a practice that becomes especially apparent when courts articulate the distinc-
tion between aesthetic and utilitarian objects in determining copyrightability of useful articles 
with pictorial, graphic, and sculptural aspects.”).
118. See Pollack, supra note 50, at 1506 n.163.
119. SPRIGMAN & RAUSTIALA, supra note 105, at 67-68.
120. Id. at 68.
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that would afford it protection. On a scientific level, the lower senses have a 
sensory immediacy not present in work involving the higher senses of sight 
and sound, which “operate at a distance from their objects”
121
and can be 
perceived and communicated in a public sense. Because of the sensory im-
mediacy with scent and flavor, the idea that the author of a scent or a taste 
wishes to express is “inextricably tied to its expression in a private way.”122
Scents and flavors are intended to be smelled and inhaled or tasted and eat-
en, making them “too tightly bound to the sensation, resulting in an inability 
to detach the idea of a taste or scent from its expression.”123 To grant copy-
right to a food dish (not just its flavor) might restrict public access to the
idea itself, which would run counter to the fundamental purpose of copy-
right protection.
The European Copyright Society “is of the opinion that smells and 
tastes constitute raw material that, in the same way as “ideas,” are excluded 
from copyright protection.”
124
The EU legal doctrine seems to be taking a 
different approach. The Levola case discussed earlier raises interesting ques-
tions. The case says in dicta that the subjective nature of a flavor prevents it 
from receiving protection. This has led the IP community to conclude
125
that 
if a company can overcome this hurdle, then copyright protection may be 
within reach for scents and flavors.
The suggestion in the case that the subjective nature of scent or flavor 
bars them from copyright protection is misguided. The inability to adequate-
ly describe a flavor in an objective manner is not the only reason a flavor is 
not copyrightable, and it might not be any reason to deny protection. It is 
doubtful that humans perceive colors on a painting or sounds in a song any
less subjectively than they taste the flavor of a food or smell the scent of a 
fragrance. Variation in human sight, age, hearing ability, and more make the 
experience and perception of all art subjective. The inability to separate a 
scent or flavor from its function in most instances (in a food or perfume, for 
example) poses the main barrier. To the extent that a scent or flavor is a 
separate aesthetic expression standing apart from a dish or perfume, and that 
the Levola court meant there was no means to separate that out, then a new 
121. Calleja, supra note 65, at 23.
122. Id. at 21.
123. Id. at 25.
124. Euro. Copyright Soc’y, supra note 70, at 6.
125. Saneep Goyal & Carol Goyal, Taste of Cheese Cannot Be Copyrighted, But Per-
fume Can Be, Say EU Courts, BUS. STANDARD (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-policy/taste-of-cheese-cannot-be-copyrighted-but-perfume-
can-be-say-eu-courts-118111800129_1.html (“To win a copyright case, companies need to 
find a way to ‘objectively’ convey the ‘taste’ of their products. The ‘description’ of ‘taste’ will 
become critical to copyright filings in the future. Such descriptions will have to be detailed, 
and defendable for uniqueness. Otherwise the courts may find copyright applications for taste 
of food difficult to digest.”).
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medium of fixation can advance an argument for scent and flavor protec-
tion.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY TO COPYRIGHT FRAMEWORK
Digitizing will change the way we understand and experience scent and 
flavor. As the technology develops, it may become more accessible and find 
new uses in the world that will lead more people to explore and experience 
scent and flavor in unchartered ways. Authors of sufficiently original scents 
and flavors will inevitably look to protect their creations. In the United 
States, this could mean lobbying to create an additional subject matter cate-
gory that explicitly includes scent and flavor. In the EU, this could mean 
somehow taking advantage of the door that Levola seemed to open.126 But 
the actual digitized scent or flavor is no different from a literary work in the 
copyright world (software). The question there becomes more about what 
that software copyright protects – does it protect the code or the underlying 
scent or flavor the code expresses? Beyond this question, it is worth consid-
ering how the technology can be useful in this space even though it may not 
substantively change the answer to the question of whether scent and flavor 
are copyrightable.
Before discussing how the technology fits into copyright law frame-
work, it is worth noting the practical concerns that come with the idea of 
granting copyright protection to a scent or flavor. One concern is undermin-
ing competition:
[O]ne worrying aspect of the protection of perfumes is the risk that 
it could lead to undue monopolies. Most humans do not have a 
highly developed sense of smell and can only distinguish a limited 
palette of scents. Different perfumes, for example, may readily be 
held to be alike, and infringements quickly found. As such, the pro-
tection of perfumes could undermine competition to an undesirable 
extent, allowing only a few perfumes to exist lawfully side-by-
side.
127
This worry, whether warranted or not, might be what has kept lower sense 
works outside of copyright protection. Perceived human inability to distin-
guish scents might simply be because there has been little opportunity or in-
centive to do so.
128
126. Digitizing transforms scent and flavor into data. Certain processing or uses of scent 
and flavor data could easily fall under the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(“GDPR”). This potential is beyond the scope of this Note, but certainly worth pointing out. 
Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119).
127. Koelman, supra note 56.
128. It is worth noting that a concern for color depletion was advanced and shut down in 
Qualitex. See supra note 25, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 
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Because U.S. copyright law functions to encourage the creation of new 
works, either by facilitating the dissemination of works to the general public 
or by incentivizing authors to create, protecting scent or flavor might stifle 
this. If monopoly is broadly construed, creations are unavailable to the pub-
lic for use and new authors are not encouraged to enter the market for fear 
of infringing a protected work. The EU’s emphasis on author’s rights might 
change the way we think about this dynamic because there protecting au-
thor’s creations weighs more heavily. With scents or foods, it begs the ques-
tions: Who is the author whose rights we hope to protect? Would protection 
mostly go to corporate conglomerates of food production and perfume man-
ufacturers?
Without going further into that discussion, it is important to look at 
whether the technology changes any of the elements required for copyright 
protection in the first place. If the technology will not lead to a different re-
sult, then there will be no use for this new technology in answering the 
question of whether copyright should extend to olfactory creations.
A. Idea Expression Dichotomy and Separability
According to its website, “Aromyx has developed a proprietary method 
to standardize and visualize the entire olfactory pattern of any given odorant 
substance, making this information actionable for customers.”
129
Standardiz-
ing and visualizing scents seems to amount to a digital readout of scent. 
This might be similar to a recipe for a dish or a fact itself (and even more 
similar to a software code for a computer program, which will be discussed 
shortly). The code created for a particular scent or taste is a description of 
the particular fragrance or flavor. This, similar to a recipe for a dish, de-
scribes the composition of the work. That scent or flavor code is likely to be 
viewed as a fact, not a copyrightable work of authorship.
Put another way, a digitized flavor is an exact copy. If copyright protec-
tion is not extended to a dish for the reasons articulated above, then it seems 
logical that protection would not extend to the exact digital copy either. 
Again, this is for instances where the scent or flavor in question is insepara-
ble from the dish itself (the flavor of macaroni and cheese) and is functional 
(taste plays a role in the experience of eating a dish). The question is differ-
ent if protection is sought for the separate aesthetic experience of a scent or 
flavor.
(1995) (“This argument is unpersuasive, however, largely because it relies on an occasional 
problem to justify a blanket prohibition.”). The court also noted that the functionality doctrine 
would further serve as a safeguard against the concern of color depletion. Qualitex, 514 U.S. 
at 168-69.
129. AROMYX, https://www.aromyx.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2020).
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B. Subject Matter
A scent or flavor must be considered copyrightable subject matter. It 
does not fall within the categories of the U.S. Copyright Act or the BC. Re-
call that Member States of the EU can expand their list of qualified works 
beyond the minimum required by the BC, but we saw how the CJEU han-
dled the Dutch High Court’s finding that a cheese flavor is, in theory, pro-
tectable.
Digitization might bring a scent or flavor under literary work, similar to 
the treatment of computer software programs. To illustrate, complex fra-
grances are better described as a scent composition. A scent has three notes. 
“The ‘top note’ is the first impression of the scent and is the most aggres-
sive, the ‘middle note’ is the body of the scent, and the ‘base note’ lingers 
after the other notes dissipate, giving the fragrance a depth and solidity.”
130
The question would be what is protected? Protection would probably extend 
not to the scent encoded, but only to the actual coding itself.
Software program protection in copyright considers a programmer’s
written code as literary text. The doctrine of copyright for computer pro-
grams is complex. As with all copyrightable works, protection is given to 
the extent that the code incorporates authorship in the programmer’s expres-
sion of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves. If other 
methods of expressing a computer program idea are foreclosed as a practical 
matter because there is really only one way to write the code, then there will 
be no protection given. This is called a “merger” between the idea and ex-
pression. It will depend on the complexities of digitizing scent and taste 
whether this line of thinking will apply. It might be that there are so few 
ways to digitally express the idea of a scent or a flavor that protection can-
not be given to the underlying “scent code.”
Unlike the computer software revolution, scent and taste have existed 
since the beginning of human existence. But it is hard to imagine how a 
novel technology, not yet broadly available to the public, with the potential 
to revolutionize how we experience lower senses, might change our percep-
tion of a literary work. However, fitting software into the literary work cate-
gorization makes much more sense in terms of the developed legal doc-
trines. Object and source code are considered languages, and the end result 
of a string of source code or object code is a work perceived by the higher 
sense of sight. It is also worth noting that squeezing computer software un-
der the category of literary work for the purpose of copyright protection has 
130. Jimmy Stamp, The First Major Museum Show to Focus on Smell, SMITHSONIAN 
MAG. (Jan. 16, 2013), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-first-major-museum-
show-to-focus-on-smell-1787124.
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not been without much criticism and controversy.
131
Furthermore, protection 
of a scent or flavor’s digital readout would go to the code, not the scent or 
flavor itself.
It is true that dicta in Levola opened up the window for a scent or flavor 
to be considered copyrightable should it lose its subjectivity and find a way 
to be described objectively with precision. It is hard to say that digitization 
changes the fundamental nature of a scent or flavor. It seems instead to 
change how those senses are experienced, replicated, shared, stored, or 
transported – their fixation. But we know that most scents and flavors are 
already meeting the fixation requirement (i.e. scent in liquid perfume). The 
issue is that the traditional mediums for scent and flavor pose problems with 
separability.
C. Originality
There are advocates who believe chefs and perfumers create works just 
as original in their expression as an artist who paints and should therefore 
benefit from the same rights as painters, writers, and musicians. But the 
question of whether chefs and perfumers are creative artists is not disposi-
tive of copyrightability. Original expression is only one of many factors to 
consider in affording a given work copyright. Regardless, the technology 
here would not change the persuasiveness of the current argument(s) con-
cerning scent and flavor’s originality.
An analogy might be helpful. Musicians’ works were considered suffi-
ciently original far before the digitization of music took place. Being able to 
record, permanently store, and transport musical works digitally did not af-
fect the question of whether they were works of original expression, and it 
certainly did not affect the question of whether they were copyrightable sub-
ject matter. It simply improved the way music could be perceived, which 
seems to be what this technology will do for scent and flavor.
V. SHOULD COPYRIGHT PROTECT SCENT AND FLAVOR?
The first question addressed in this Note was whether scent or flavor are 
copyrightable. Traditionally, this question has been considered only when 
scent and flavor are fixed in mediums such as food or perfume. The next is-
sue discussed was how the digitization of scent and flavor changes the anal-
ysis by providing a new means of fixation. An important question to think 
about now is whether we should afford protection to scents and tastes via 
copyright and why this new technology sparks debate.
131. Ralph Omar, Computer Software as Copyrightable Subject Matter: Oracle v. 
Google, Legislative Intent, and the Scope of Rights in Digital Works, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
639, 640 (2018).
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Scent or flavor, as an aesthetic experience separate from a food dish or 
perfume, fit the requirements of copyrightability. A scent or flavor can be 
made with significant creative and intellectual input from the author. Levo-
la’s suggestion that flavor cannot be described with precision will surely be 
overcome by technology. Before sound recordings, music arguably could 
not truly be described with precision. There was, however, sheet music. The 
ability to write down music might have played a role in its historical protec-
tion under copyright as compared to olfactory works. Digitization theoreti-
cally could introduce a means of “writing down” scents and flavors and cer-
tainly can provide a new means of fixation.
That scents and flavors are creative works worthy of copyright protec-
tion does not mean that they should receive protection right now under the 
current copyright regime. The fact that scent and flavor cannot fit neatly in-
to any enumerated subject matter category is a good reason not to give them 
copyright protection. Attempting to fit scent and flavor into an existing cat-
egory would pose problems. The fashion industry, without recourse to trade 
secret or patent protection like the food and perfume industries, has a histo-
ry of pushing for its own explicit category in the Copyright Act to combat 
fast fashion copying.
132
Considering that some perfume scents and food fla-
vors have received patent protection as a composition of matter or a process, 
copyright law should not become a back door to receiving arguably broader 
intellectual property protection. On the other hand, because digitization 
could threaten trade secret protection and some scents and flavors will not 
meet patent requirements, copyright protection becomes an even more at-
tractive option.
In 1990, Congress enacted the Architectural Works Copyright Protec-
tion Act, which added architectural works as a protected subject matter cat-
egory.
133
The term “architectural work” is defined in the Act as “the design 
of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including 
a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall 
form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in 
the design, but does not include individual standard features.”
134
Much con-
sideration went into this addition.
135
The definition itself excludes standard 
features likely to be found in all buildings, meaning that these building fea-
tures will not receive copyright protection. The exceptions contemplate the 
fact that architectural works are often in public spaces where they are sus-
132. For more information on the fashion industry’s attempts and the Copyright Office’s
views on protection for fashion designs, see Protection for Fashion Design: Hearing on H.R. 
5055 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of the United States Copyright Office).
133. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 
(1990).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
135. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 10-15 (1990).
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ceptible to passerby taking photographs or making drawings of them. Like-
wise, architectural works are subject to updates, alterations, or even destruc-
tion by building owners. Ordinarily these actions would violate the exclu-
sive rights granted to authors, and so the new category was crafted to permit 
pictorial representations and alteration and/or destruction of buildings.
136
It does not make sense to incorporate scents and flavors into one of the 
existing subject matter categories. Copyright protection should not extend to 
scents and flavors unless Congress carves out a distinct category. This 
would allow for consideration of what exceptions make the most sense in 
order to best advance the goals of copyright law. The fact that most scents 
and flavors would be tied to a food item or perfume is an important consid-
eration that would require statutory drafting that limits protection of the en-
tire food item/perfume itself.
137
Congress is best suited to consider whether 
other areas of intellectual property law are sufficiently protecting scents and 
flavors right now (for example, patent law) and also to analyze relevant em-
pirical data, like the extent to which humans are capable of discerning be-
tween scents and flavors such that any protection of them is properly cali-
brated and does not foreclose too many from use.
CONCLUSION
The digitization of scents and flavors will change the way we analyze, 
experience, and use them. It changes the fixation of scent and flavor so that 
they can be permanent and stable as well as exist as a separate sensory aes-
thetic experience of their own. In particular, the technology brings an in-
creased threat of reverse engineering that could damage trade secret protec-
tion and cause irreparable harm. This makes it important that the law 
preemptively considers how this technology might affect intellectual proper-
ty protection of scents and flavors. As discussed in Parts III and IV, there is 
complexity around scents and flavors regarding fixation and functionality. 
Because of this, caution should be exercised before granting protection 
within the copyright law framework as it currently stands in the United 
States and in the EU. As the technology digitizing scent and flavor contin-
ues to develop, Congress should consider adding a new subject matter cate-
gory to the Copyright Act for the aesthetic experience of scent and flavor. 
This would allow for appropriately carved out copyright protection for scent 
and flavor that incorporates exceptions in order to address the novel issues 
that arise with these sensory works.
136. Id. § 120.
137. It is far from clear that the food industry is uniformly committed to copyright pro-
tection in chef’s creations. In fact, the culture of the industry might suggest otherwise. See
SPRIGMAN & RAUSTIALA, supra note 105, at 76-77.
